Section 301 investigations target allies and rivals alike as Washington races to rebuild its tariff toolkit before a July deadline
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"They lost in court, so naturally they opened sixteen more courts of their own — one does admire a man who, told he cannot have the cake, simply builds a bakery."
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The agency responsible for developing and coordinating U.S. international trade policy, including negotiating trade agreements and enforcing trade laws.
The executive branch of the European Union, responsible for trade policy on behalf of 27 member states.
USTR scheduled public hearings to receive testimony from interested parties on the manufacturing overcapacity allegations.
USTR opened the public comment period for all 16 investigations, with written submissions due by April 15.
USTR Greer announced investigations into China, the EU, India, Japan, South Korea, Mexico, Taiwan, and nine other economies over structural excess manufacturing capacity across more than 20 industrial sectors.
In Learning Resources Inc. v. Trump, the court ruled that IEEPA does not authorize presidential tariffs. Within hours, the White House imposed a replacement 10% global tariff under Section 122 of the Trade Act, which expires after 150 days.
The U.S. Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's decision that IEEPA does not authorize tariffs, sending the case toward the Supreme Court.
Washington and Brussels agreed to cap EU tariffs at 15% in exchange for EU commitments to purchase $750 billion in U.S. energy and invest $600 billion in the United States by 2028.
The U.S. Court of International Trade unanimously ruled that IEEPA does not authorize the president to impose tariffs, the first judicial check on the tariff program.
Trump announced a universal 10% tariff with higher rates up to 50% on specific trading partners based on trade balances, all under IEEPA authority.
President Trump signed executive orders imposing 25% tariffs on Canada and Mexico and 10% on China using the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, a statute never before used for tariffs.
Discussed by: CNBC, Global Trade Alert, Covington & Burling trade analysts
The administration concludes investigations quickly and imposes new Section 301 tariffs on some or all 16 economies before the Section 122 tariff expires on July 24. This would give the administration uncapped, indefinite tariff authority without needing congressional approval. The rushed timeline raises questions about whether the investigations can withstand legal challenge, but Section 301 has survived court scrutiny before—the Federal Circuit upheld the 2018 China tariffs in 2024.
Discussed by: Bruegel Institute, German Marshall Fund trade analysts
Rather than imposing tariffs on all 16 economies, the administration uses the threat of Section 301 action to extract concessions—similar to how the Turnberry framework emerged under IEEPA tariff pressure. Allies like the EU, Japan, and South Korea negotiate reduced tariffs or exemptions in exchange for commitments on manufacturing investment, energy purchases, or market access for American goods. This would fragment the 16-economy probe into a series of bilateral negotiations.
Discussed by: Tax Foundation, Penn Wharton Budget Model, Yale Budget Lab
If investigations take longer than expected and Section 122 tariffs expire on July 24 without congressional extension, the effective average tariff rate could drop from roughly 13.7% to under 6%—still historically high but a significant reduction. This would create a window where the only remaining tariffs are the Section 232 duties on steel, aluminum, and autos, plus any pre-existing trade measures.
Discussed by: European Commission, South China Morning Post, East Asia Forum
Multiple targeted economies impose retaliatory tariffs or invoke World Trade Organization dispute mechanisms. The EU has already signaled it could reactivate levies on €93 billion in American imports and deploy its Anti-Coercion Instrument. If major economies coordinate their responses, the result could be a broader trade conflict that raises costs for businesses operating across borders and disrupts supply chains that have already been reshuffled by five years of tariff uncertainty.
President Reagan imposed 100% tariffs on $300 million worth of Japanese electronics after concluding that Japan had violated a 1986 semiconductor trade agreement by dumping chips in third-country markets and restricting American access to Japan's semiconductor market. It was the most aggressive use of Section 301 up to that point.
Japan made concessions on market access, and Reagan lifted most tariffs by November 1987.
A new semiconductor agreement was reached in 1991. Japan's semiconductor market share declined over the following decade, while the episode established Section 301 as a credible enforcement tool against major trading partners.
The 1987 case demonstrated that Section 301 can produce results against allied economies, not just adversaries. The current probes similarly target U.S. allies—Japan, the EU, South Korea—alongside China, using the same legal authority.
USTR launched a Section 301 investigation into China's practices regarding technology transfer, intellectual property, and innovation. The findings led to tariffs on over $300 billion in Chinese goods at rates of 7.5% to 25%, imposed in four waves between July 2018 and September 2019.
China retaliated with tariffs on U.S. agricultural and manufactured goods. A Phase 1 trade deal in January 2020 paused escalation but left most tariffs in place.
The tariffs persisted through the Biden administration, which raised some rates further in 2024. The Federal Circuit upheld their legality in 2024, establishing that Section 301 tariffs can survive judicial review.
The 2018 China investigation is the direct legal and strategic template for the current probes. It proved that Section 301 can sustain tariffs of this scale, and the same office—now led by Greer, who served as Lighthizer's chief of staff during the original investigation—is running these new probes.
Congress raised tariffs on over 20,000 imported goods to shield American industries during the Great Depression. Thirty-five governments formally protested. Canada, France, and other trading partners imposed retaliatory tariffs within months.
Global trade collapsed by 66% between 1929 and 1934. U.S. exports to retaliating nations fell 28-32%.
The backlash led to the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934, which shifted tariff-setting authority from Congress to the executive branch—the same framework the current administration is now navigating.
Smoot-Hawley is the cautionary precedent for broad, simultaneous tariff action against many trading partners at once. The current probes target 16 economies representing the vast majority of U.S. trade, raising similar questions about coordinated retaliation and supply chain disruption.