US and Israel launch joint military campaign against Iran

Discussed by: Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Foundation for Defense of Democracies analysts, and senior Republican lawmakers framing the operation as a limited precision campaign

In this outcome, the US and Israel accomplish their stated military objectives — destroying Iran's remaining nuclear infrastructure, degrading its missile arsenal, and eliminating senior leadership — then halt operations and negotiate a ceasefire through Omani or other intermediaries. Iran's interim governing council, weakened and facing domestic upheaval, agrees to verifiable nuclear disarmament. This scenario depends on Iran's retaliatory capacity being sufficiently degraded and on the administration resisting pressure to pursue ground operations or prolonged occupation.

Discussed by: Chatham House, Stimson Center, and multiple Middle Eastern foreign policy analysts warning of escalation risks across Lebanon, Yemen, and Iraq

Iran's remaining proxy networks — including the Houthis in Yemen, militias in Iraq, and remnants of Hezbollah in Lebanon — escalate attacks on US forces and allied states, drawing the conflict beyond Iran's borders. The Houthis have already resumed Red Sea shipping attacks. If proxy escalation forces the US to open additional fronts, the "precision air campaign" framing collapses and the operation begins to resemble the kind of open-ended Middle Eastern entanglement Trump campaigned against. Gulf states that initially supported the strikes could withdraw cooperation if their infrastructure continues to take retaliatory fire.

Discussed by: Foreign Policy, The Intercept, and historians drawing explicit parallels to post-Saddam Iraq and post-Gaddafi Libya

With Khamenei dead, senior military leaders killed, the economy in freefall, and massive protests already underway, the Islamic Republic's governing structure fractures. The interim council proves unable to consolidate control. Competing factions — reformists, IRGC hardliners, ethnic separatist movements — vie for power. This scenario would present the US with the same question that haunted the Iraq and Libya interventions: having destroyed the existing order, who or what replaces it? Iran's population of 88 million is roughly three times Iraq's at the time of the 2003 invasion.

Discussed by: Constitutional scholars at Just Security, the National Constitution Center, and bipartisan sponsors of the Kaine-Paul and Massie-Khanna resolutions

The bipartisan war powers resolutions gain enough support to pass both chambers but fall short of a veto-proof majority, creating a political confrontation without a legal resolution. If US casualties mount or the operation's duration extends beyond weeks, public opinion could shift enough to pressure additional Republican defections. The constitutional question — whether a president can wage an undeclared war of this scale — may ultimately reach the courts, though judicial precedent has historically favored executive discretion in military matters.

Discussed by: Pentagon analysts, Middle East policy experts, and regional security observers noting Hezbollah, Houthi, and Iraqi militia responses

With Iran's conventional military severely degraded, the regime's remaining proxy networks—Hezbollah in Lebanon, Houthis in Yemen, and militias in Iraq—escalate attacks on US forces and regional allies. Hezbollah has already claimed multiple attacks on Israeli positions. If proxy escalation forces the US to open additional fronts or conduct sustained operations across multiple countries, the 'precision air campaign' framing collapses and the operation begins to resemble the kind of open-ended Middle Eastern entanglement Trump campaigned against.

Discussed by: Intelligence analysts and Iranian political experts noting reports of Khamenei's son as potential successor and Assembly of Experts deliberations

With Khamenei dead and senior military leadership decimated, Iran's succession process becomes contested. Reports suggest Khamenei's son Mojtaba as a candidate, but the Assembly of Experts must formally appoint a new Supreme Leader. A prolonged power vacuum could see competing factions—IRGC hardliners, reformists, ethnic separatists—vie for control, creating instability that could either accelerate regime collapse or trigger internal conflict that draws in US forces.

Discussed by: Constitutional scholars, bipartisan war powers sponsors (Kaine-Paul, Massie-Khanna), and legal experts at Just Security

If US casualties mount or the operation extends beyond weeks, public opinion could shift enough to pressure additional Republican defections on war powers votes. Bipartisan resolutions could pass both chambers but fall short of veto-proof majorities, creating a political confrontation without legal resolution. The constitutional question—whether a president can wage an undeclared war of this scale—may ultimately reach courts, though judicial precedent has historically favored executive discretion.

Discussed by: Pentagon analysts, military strategists, and defense officials evaluating operational options

With air superiority established and 2,500 additional Marines deployed, the US could transition from air campaign to ground operations aimed at securing Iran's nuclear facilities at Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan. This would represent a fundamental shift from precision strikes to occupation, dramatically increasing US casualty risk and commitment duration. Success would require sustained ground presence and coordination with potential Iranian successor government or occupation administration.

Discussed by: Trump administration officials, international maritime security analysts, and regional naval commanders

Trump's call for international assistance could catalyze a multinational naval coalition to counter Iranian mine-laying and drone attacks in the Strait of Hormuz. China, Japan, South Korea, and European nations dependent on Gulf oil could contribute vessels, creating a de facto international blockade of Iranian maritime operations. This would formalize the conflict's internationalization and potentially establish long-term Western naval presence in the region.

Discussed by: Iranian political analysts, succession experts, and intelligence assessments

With Mojtaba Khamenei formally selected as Supreme Leader, Iran's succession crisis could resolve faster than anticipated. If the new leader consolidates support from remaining IRGC factions and regional allies, the regime could stabilize despite military losses. This would complicate US objectives by providing Iran with unified leadership to negotiate ceasefire or manage prolonged conflict.

Discussed by: Middle East security analysts, proxy network experts, and regional intelligence services

With Iran's conventional military severely degraded, the regime could shift strategy toward proxy escalation through Hezbollah in Lebanon, Houthis in Yemen, and militias in Iraq. These networks could target US forces, regional allies, and global shipping, forcing the US to open multiple fronts and sustain operations across the region indefinitely.

Discussed by: Regional security analysts, Gulf state defense officials, and international energy experts

With Iran's conventional military severely degraded, the regime shifts strategy toward targeting non-US assets in neighboring Gulf states. Iran's March 15 threats to UAE ports and calls for evacuations signal a new phase of escalation. If Iran follows through with strikes on civilian energy infrastructure, Gulf states hosting US bases could withdraw cooperation, forcing the US to operate from more distant locations and complicating logistics for sustained operations.

Discussed by: Trump administration officials, international maritime security analysts, and regional naval commanders

Trump's call for international assistance could catalyze a multinational naval coalition to counter Iranian mine-laying and drone attacks in the Strait of Hormuz. However, Iran's demonstrated ability to nearly halt shipping despite air superiority suggests that even a coalition fleet would face sustained attrition from mines, drones, and remaining missile systems, potentially making the Strait economically unviable for months.

Discussed by: UN agencies, humanitarian organizations, and international diplomacy experts

With 3.2 million Iranians displaced and oil prices surging 40 percent, international pressure for a ceasefire could mount rapidly. UN agencies and humanitarian organizations may call for immediate negotiations, and neutral countries like Oman could re-engage mediation efforts. The scale of displacement rivals major refugee crises and could force the US to choose between military objectives and humanitarian concerns.

Discussed by: Political analysts, national security experts, and congressional observers noting Kent's departure as potential first of multiple resignations

Joe Kent's resignation on March 17 signals potential fracture within the Trump administration's national security apparatus. If additional senior officials resign over the war's legal basis or necessity, it could trigger a broader political crisis and embolden congressional war powers challenges. The administration's internal divisions could weaken its ability to sustain the operation if key officials publicly question its justification.

Discussed by: Regional security analysts, Gulf state defense officials, and international energy experts noting March 17 strikes on Abu Dhabi and Dubai

Iran's March 17 strikes on Abu Dhabi and drone attacks near Dubai's airport and Fujairah Oil Industry Zone represent a significant escalation beyond military targets to civilian and energy infrastructure in non-US Gulf states. If Iran continues this pattern, it could force Gulf states hosting US bases to withdraw cooperation, complicate US logistics, and trigger humanitarian crises that force international pressure for ceasefire.